A Profile of Communist Insurgency- The Case of Thailand

A profile of communist insurgency in Thailand, a Department of State briefing prepared in April 1967, offers a contemporary analysis of the insurgent threat in Southeast Asia. It appears in the public archive of The Black Vault, a repository for declassified U.S. government records. The document was released to the public through The Black Vault’s online collection, identified by its entry for “A Profile of Communist Insurgency—The Case of Thailand.” The material was declassified twelve years after its original date of origin, in accordance with an internal declassification authority. The release date on the site is listed as the early 1970s, and the file is available for download as a text file at the Black Vault URL. Now, the document itself. The senior seminar in foreign policy, ninth session of 1966‑1967, presents the following preface. “The challenge of insurgency in our time cannot be avoided by citizens or officials in the United States as long as this nation fulfills its responsibilities as a global power, willing and able to exert resources outside of its borders on behalf of deeply rooted values and perceived interests. Such exertion need not mean a total, automatic or standard response to every insurgency everywhere. I only suggest here that insurgency has become a key weapon in the arsenal of revolution‑makers whose doctrine of social and political change is the antithesis of our own. Moreover, if reciprocal nuclear deterrence holds, the probabilities are high that insurgency, in one form or another, will be a major conflict form in the decades ahead. “This case study was therefore stimulated by my belief that insurgency must be understood by responsible professionals in the field of foreign affairs whose area of concern, at one time or another, must impinge, either at the policy or operational level, on an insurgency problem, actual or potential. The Asian theatre is currently the most active and in Thailand there exists what may be called ‘under‑developed insurgency’; it presents an interesting complex of political, economic, ethnic and psychological factors. My aim in this study was self‑education rather than the enlightenment of the foreign affairs community. The study has been rewarding in this sense. “Assistance is acknowledged, with appreciation, from many persons in Washington and abroad. Encouragement, ideas, materials were provided by officials of the Department of State, the Agency for International Development, the Central Intelligence Agency, the United States Information Service, the Government of Thailand, American personnel in Tokyo, Hongkong, Saigon, Vientiane, London, and especially in Bangkok and Udorn, Thailand. Since my concentration was on the insurgency side rather than on the counter effort, intelligence reports were essential as a basis for study. CIA officers concerned with the insurgency in Thailand were, without exception, highly knowledgeable and generous with their time. “The main body of the case study focuses on the insurgency itself, as presently perceived, placing it in a historical and geographic context. It is necessarily a condensation of a vast amount of material on the subject. On the chance that some readers may be interested in the broader ground covered by my own educative effort, I have included several annexes which hopefully add color and contour to the topography of the communist insurgency in Thailand.” The introduction to insurgency continues: “Total political war. One of the more compelling, complex and controversial facets of current history is summed up in the word ‘insurgency.’ Korea excepted, serious international conflict since the Second World War has, more often than not, been played out in the unconventional arena theatre of the guerrilla whose neo‑classical scenario dominates the harsh drama of contemporary warfare as actually staged and not merely rehearsed in military games. The incidence of insurgency, the audacity of its goals, the elevation of its strategy to the level of doctrine in the communist world, the refinement of its tactics and techniques combine to support the assignment of special weight to insurgency in the current balance of international politics. “There is no paucity of literature on the subject. Bibliographies grow