CIA: Cold Open.

Cold Open. This is a declassified Central Intelligence Agency memorandum dated December twenty-first, nineteen seventy‑nine. The memo concerns an update on the Thai‑Kampuchean border and assesses a possible Chinese connection to activity in that area. It is notable because it reflects the agency’s analytical perspective on regional tensions at the height of the Cold War. Provenance. The document was released to the public through the Black Vault archive, documents2.theblackvault.com, as part of a broader declassification effort by the Central Intelligence Agency. The record is identified in the archive by its file name and was made available without restriction, bearing the agency’s “Approved for Release” designation. The Document. Memorandum for: G‑N‑I‑O‑W. From: Strategic Warning Staff. Subject: Thai‑Kampuchean Border Update; Chinese Connection. It is our impression that the conventional wisdom among community analysts is that there is small if any likelihood of a Chinese “second lesson” against Vietnam, whatever may develop as a result of the current Vietnamese offensive in the Thai‑Kampuchean border area. There are nevertheless some worrisome signs that the Chinese may be undertaking more extensive preparations than generally has been recognized. Not the least of our concern is our uncertainty with regard to the real state of the community’s knowledge of what the Chinese military posture is in the SRV‑PRC border area, and what the Chinese have been up to in recent months. Should China decide to take some action in the south, its forces would be better prepared and more mobilized than they were prior to a vast war. The Sino‑Vietnamese border situation remains tense. Border clashes continue and the latest Chinese protest to the Vietnamese over such provocations, on November twentieth, included the same final sentence that was used by the People’s Republic of China shortly before the last invasion. Additional reporting reflects the possibility of Chinese action. While we continue to see an improved military posture in the border area and note the continued tense situation and political concern, we do not have evidence of massive troop movement or buildup required to in fact teach Vietnam a second lesson. We believe, however, that China has reason not to deploy troops as openly as it did for the last invasion, and that it would use surprise to a greater advantage. Like most other analysts in the community, I have difficulty believing China will initiate a second lesson. However, most of us did not believe China would attack last time. I provide the following figures, not to contest community discussion of them. Against the above background we need a high‑estimate of border forces total which could reach the border approximately within a two‑week period. Context. The Black Vault archive notes that this memorandum “provides insight into CIA analysts’ assessment of Chinese strategic intentions in the late 1970s, highlighting both the perceived low probability of a direct Chinese intervention and the lingering uncertainty about Chinese military preparations along the Sino