CIA: This episode presents a declassified Central Intelligence Agency record on

This episode presents a declassified Central Intelligence Agency record on Chinese domestic politics, recent developments, circa nineteen‑eighty. The memorandum is notable for its assessment of the Chinese Communist Party’s Fifth Plenum and the emerging succession dynamics within the leadership. The document was released to the public through a Freedom of Information Act request, case number not disclosed, with the declassification authority listed as the Central Intelligence Agency. The release occurred in September nineteen‑hundred‑two, and the full text is available from The Black Vault archive. Executive Summary Since the beginning of the year the Chinese leadership has made significant progress in preparing for a smooth succession to a younger leadership. The pivotal event was the Chinese Communist Party’s Fifth Plenum, at which Deng Xiaoping successfully elevated to the topmost level of the leadership those who share his reform‑minded approach to China’s problems and removed from the Politburo the remaining symbols of leftist opposition. Despite the Fifth Plenum’s achievements in preparing the succession, there are still underlying economic and social issues that will bear directly on the prospects for stability. The Fifth Plenum did not deal in a major way with military affairs, but before its convocation the high command of the People’s Liberation Army underwent the most extensive reshuffle since the early nineteen seventies. While some of these shifts were designed to pave the way for the Plenum by displacing those generals suspected of having leftist ties, most were aimed at elevating younger, capable officers to important command positions. The most significant change was the promotion of Yang Dezhi to PLA Chief of Staff and to the Party Secretariat. Yang’s elevation to the latter post came at the expense of Geng Biao, who was initially proposed for the job. Despite this setback there is no evidence that Geng is in serious political trouble. In the aftermath of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Chinese have given no sign that they intend to invest a larger proportion of funds in military modernization. Discussion Since the beginning of the year the Chinese leadership has made major progress toward preparing for a smooth succession to a younger leadership. The pivotal event in this regard was the Chinese Communist Party’s Fifth Plenum, held in late February, which represented a personal triumph for Deng Xiaoping. The personnel and organizational changes approved by the Plenum were designed to ensure long‑term political continuity and stability while China pursues its modernization program. The dismissal of four Politburo members considered to be leftist holdovers strengthens Deng’s hand and removes a symbol of resistance to his policies. Their fall also helps clear the way for the thorough‑going reform and revitalization of the party bureaucracy that Deng and his colleagues consider essential for successful implementation of modernization policies. In the aftermath of the Plenum almost all of China’s provinces have held high‑level meetings to lay the groundwork for dealing with the factionalism, corruption, and ideological confusion that has beset the party since the Cultural Revolution. The elevation of two Deng proteges, Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang, to key positions in the hierarchy should prepare them to take over the reins of power during the next few years. Last month Zhao was appointed “presiding vice premier,” a designation that suggests he oversees the day‑to‑day work of the government. Hu Yaobang is General Secretary of the Central Committee, presiding over a reconstituted Party Secretariat. Hu and Zhao bear a distinctly Dengist stamp, but neither man is yet in an unchallengeable position of power, and both will be reliant on Deng for political support and policy guidance for some time. There are reportedly some in the leadership who are not happy with the kind of succession arrangements that appear to push aside older leaders still in good health. These senior leaders will probably continue to act at times as a brake on Deng and his reformist team. Unlike the four leftists, they do not represent a consistent, programmatic opposition to Deng, but rather they raise occasional objections to the pace and extent