CIA: CHINA’S AIRBORNE PHOTORECONNAISSANCE CAPABILITY – DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE REPORT

CHINA’S AIRBORNE PHOTORECONNAISSANCE CAPABILITY – DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE REPORT, FEBRUARY 1980. THIS DECLASSIFIED CIA ANALYTIC FROM THE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY IS NOTABLE BECAUSE IT PROVIDES ONE OF THE EARLIEST DETAILED U.S. ASSESSMENTS OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA’S AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE RESOURCES DURING THE LATE‑1970S. THE DOCUMENT IS AVAILABLE THROUGH THE BLACK VAULT ARCHIVE. THE RECORD WAS RELEASED THROUGH A FOIA RESPONSE. THE DECLASSIFICATION NOTICE STATES THAT THE REPORT WAS DECLASSIFIED ON REVIEW ON SEPTEMBER ONE, TWO THOUSAND. THE DECLASSIFYING AUTHORITY IS THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, AND THE RELEASE IS NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS. THE FULL TEXT IS HOSTED AT THE BLACK VAULT, WITH THE DIGITAL REPOSITORY LINK PROVIDED IN THE EPISODE NOTES. NOW, THE DOCUMENT. SUMMARY. EXTENSIVE ASSOCIATED CAMERA SYSTEMS PROVIDED INFORMATION ON THE CAPABILITIES AND LIMITATIONS OF CHINA’S AIRBORNE PHOTORECONNAISSANCE RESOURCES. NEW DATABASE INPUTS INDICATE THAT PREVIOUS ASSESSMENTS OF THE SIZE AND CAPABILITIES OF THE CHINESE PHOTO‑RECONNAISSANCE FORCE WERE OPTIMISTIC. ANALYSIS OF AVAILABLE TECHNICAL REPORTS AND KNOWN OPERATING PROCEDURES SHOWS THAT CHINA’S STRATEGIC PHOTORECONNAISSANCE CAPABILITY IS ALMOST NONEXISTENT, AND THAT ITS CAPABILITY TO CONDUCT TACTICAL AIR RECONNAISSANCE IS ONLY MARGINAL WHEN LIKELY TACTICAL SITUATIONS ARE CONSIDERED. THIS CAPABILITY IS CHARACTERIZED BY OBSOLETE CAMERA SYSTEMS, TIME‑CONSUMING PROCESSING AND EVALUATION METHODS, AND AIRBORNE PLATFORMS WHOSE PROBABILITY OF SURVIVING IN A HIGH‑THREAT ENVIRONMENT IS VERY LOW. PHOTORECONNAISSANCE REQUIREMENTS DURING COMBAT OPERATIONS WHERE THE AIR DEFENSE ENVIRONMENT IS MINIMAL, AS IN THE RECENT CHINA‑VIETNAM CONFLICT, WOULD PROBABLY HAVE A HIGH RATE OF SUCCESS. SUSTAINING BOTH A LACK OF NEAR‑REAL‑TIME INTERPRETING CAPABILITY AND HIGHLY VULNERABLE COLLECTION PLATFORMS, CHINA’S TACTICAL RECONNAISSANCE CAPABILITY IS SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCED AGAINST A HIGHLY MOBILE ENEMY WITH SOPHISTICATED DEFENSES SUCH AS THE SOVIET UNION. THE CHINESE ARE AWARE OF THESE DEFICIENCIES AND HAVE EMBARKED ON A PROGRAM TO UPGRADE TACTICAL PHOTORECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS. NEW DEVELOPMENTS RANGE FROM HIGHER‑PERFORMANCE PLATFORMS TO BETTER CAMERA SYSTEMS AND MOST LIKELY INCLUDE IMPROVED PROCESSING EQUIPMENT AND METHODS. WHEN WIDELY DEPLOYED, THESE NEW SYSTEMS SHOULD SOMEWHAT IMPROVE AIRCRAFT SURVIVABILITY AND RESULT IN A FASTER CYCLE TIME FOR PHOTO‑INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTS. HOWEVER, FOR THE NEAR TERM CHINA’S TACTICAL PHOTORECONNAISSANCE CAPABILITY WILL CONTINUE TO BE LIMITED BY THE 1950S TECHNOLOGY OF ITS EXISTING SYSTEMS. COMMAND AND CONTROL. ALL AIR FORCE UNITS, INCLUDING INTERCEPT RECONNAISSANCE SQUADRONS, ARE SUBORDINATE TO THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AIR FORCE HEADQUARTERS IN BEIJING. OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF MOST UNITS, HOWEVER, IS MAINTAINED BY THE AIR FORCE COMMAND OF THE MILITARY REGION TO WHICH THEY ARE ASSIGNED. DURING EMERGENCY CONDITIONS, AIR FORCE HEADQUARTERS COULD ASSIGN MISSIONS DIRECTLY TO ANY AIR FORCE UNIT WITHOUT NOTIFYING THE REGIONAL COMMAND, THOUGH THIS BYPASS OF THE CHAIN OF COMMAND IS NOT COMMON PRACTICE. TASKING AUTHORITY. PHOTORECONNAISSANCE TASKING AUTHORITY IS HELD BY TWO COMMAND AUTHORITIES: THE RECONNAISSANCE DIVISION, INTELLIGENCE DE