CIA: This is a declassified Central Intelligence Agency intelligence report on the

This is a declassified Central Intelligence Agency intelligence report on the Chinese view of the crisis in Southwest Asia, dated March seventh, nineteen eighty. The document is notable because it records Beijing’s assessment of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and outlines the strategic considerations that guided Chinese policy toward Pakistan, India, Iran and the broader region. The report was released to the public through The Black Vault, which hosts the full text of the document on its archive site. The digital file is identified by the URL https://archive.org/download/us-china-intel-CI02181/CI02181_djvu.txt. The declassification authority is listed as the Central Intelligence Agency, and the document was made available without further restriction. The Chinese view of the crisis in Southwest Asia: past relations, current policy, prospect. Beijing interpreted the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan as a significant expansionist threat that poses global dangers, particularly to Western interests and indirectly to China itself. In the past Beijing has viewed Southwest Asia as having relatively remote implications for China’s own security, but it has now seized on the Afghan invasion to sound the alarm about Soviet intentions and to use its case against détente as a smokescreen for Soviet aggression. The Chinese view the Soviet move into Afghanistan as a particularly disturbing extension of the Brezhnev Doctrine outside of the Soviet bloc. For the first time Moscow used its own troops against a Third World country. With Cuban forces in Africa and the Vietnamese expansion in Southeast Asia, Beijing believes the Soviets are moving to establish a stranglehold on the oil routes from the Persian Gulf. This hold would threaten the balance of power between the Soviet Union and the West and would ultimately jeopardize China’s own security. The Chinese have long held that Soviet expansionism is focused on Europe, and thus China is not immediately threatened. Now, however, introducing a new wrinkle into its strategic line, Beijing asserts that the invasion of Afghanistan has “linked” Soviet strategies in the East and the West. While still acknowledging that the primary threat is to the West, the new argument maintains that a growing threat to Chinese interests has increased Beijing’s “international responsibility.” China realizes it has a limited ability to project its own power into the region. To date, it has reacted to the threat almost solely through diplomacy: it has yet to offer any commitment of significant economic or military assistance. The Chinese response thus far has proceeded along five tracks. First, reassurance to Pakistan. China moved promptly to reassure Pakistan of its support, but this so far consists more of diplomatic statements than substantive assistance. The major elements of Beijing’s policy have been attempts to help broker a rapprochement between Pakistan and India and to encourage assistance from the United States. Second, renewal of efforts at normalizing Chinese relations with India and Iran. In the wake of both the Soviet invasion and the election of Indira Gandhi, China has renewed its effort to normalize relations with India; the effort was stalled a year ago when China invaded Vietnam while the Indian foreign minister was in Beijing. Despite the strain caused by the Vietnam invasion, bilateral relations did not revert to the old level of hostility. Beijing is continuing to seek improved relations with a notable degree of determination and finesse. Gandhi, however, is cautious about responding to Chinese overtures, given her long‑standing deep suspicions of China, her country’s close relations with the Soviet Union, and her policy of opposing further arms assistance to Pakistan and the Afghan rebels. It is therefore unlikely that there will be an early breakthrough in bilateral relations. On the other hand, given the persistence of the Chinese effort, the inclination of some elements in the Indian bureaucracy to improve relations, and