CIA: The document you are hearing is a declassified Central Intelligence Agency

The document you are hearing is a declassified Central Intelligence Agency warning assessment on East Asia, dated twenty-six August, nineteen‑eighty. It is notable because it captures the intelligence community’s view of political and military developments across the region at a critical moment in the Cold War, and it was released to the public in early 2006. The memorandum was made public through a Freedom of Information Act request processed by the Central Intelligence Agency. The release date was twelve January, two thousand six, and the declassification authority was the Director of Central Intelligence. The material is reproduced from the Black Vault archive, which hosts the full text of the record. The memorandum is addressed to the Director of Central Intelligence and the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, and it was transmitted through the Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment, the National Intelligence Officer for Warning, and the National Intelligence Officer for East Asia. The subject line reads: Warning Assessment: East Asia. The following items were discussed by community representatives at the twenty‑first August warning meeting. Item one: Analysts confirmed that the five top Party leaders would resign their government posts at the upcoming National People’s Congress session. In addition, reports indicated that a number of senior economic planners would resign, suggesting a major shake‑up in economic policy. Analysts noted apparent efforts by Hua Guofeng to assert influence within the military—Hua, as Party Chairman, would retain his chairmanship of the Military Affairs Commission—but they judged Hua’s influence to be limited by the recent appointment of Deng Xiaoping supporters to senior military positions. Rumors of a coup d’état involving figures such as Fang Yi and Xu Shiyou were discounted. Item two: In commenting on Chinese reactions to President Ronald Reagan’s statements regarding the Taiwan question, analysts believed that the hard Chinese line concerning official U.S. relations with Taiwan was based on principle, and that the Chinese would not back down. Item three: Regarding Sino‑Soviet relations, attention was called to an authoritative speech by a vice president of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences stating that the Soviets were no longer to be considered revisionists. Analysts noted that despite this higher‑level view, China’s differences with the Soviets remained deep‑seated, and no improvement in relations could be anticipated. Item four: No change was noted in the respective forces along the Sino‑Soviet border. The assistant Chinese military attaché in Washington had told Department of Defense officials that the Chinese were aware of quantitative and qualitative Soviet force improvements, but not yet at a level requiring a Chinese response. Item five: Analysts reported that the Chinese had “hit” the Vietnamese hard in early August, coinciding with a period of increased anti‑Chinese propaganda between the third and the tenth of August. They doubted that a second lesson was forthcoming, and concluded that China intended only low‑level attacks, while using arms aid to anti‑Vietnamese Montagnard groups to create trouble for Hanoi behind its lines. Item six: No signs of opposition had been noted to General Chun Du‑Hwan’s ascendency; Chun now appeared firmly entrenched. It was speculated that the first sign of popular reaction, if any, would emerge at the time of the referendum on the new constitution in October. Analysts suggested Chun might rely on the Democratic Republican Party as a vehicle to attain the presidency in nineteen‑eighty‑one, possibly involving cooperation with Kim Chong‑Pil. Item seven: It was suggested that Republic of Korea generals were watching the United States closely to see the American reaction to Chun’s moves, but would act as they deemed necessary regardless. Joint military planning such as the Southeast Asia Cooperation Mission was in limbo but could be revived on a reduced scale if circumstances warranted. Item eight: The Republic of Korea’s economic situation was described as being in a downturn and likely to remain so. Problems could be anticipated if authorities attempted to cut workers’ wages to make Korean exports more competitive. Item nine: On North Korea, analysts cited features emerging from Congressman Stephen Solarz’s conversation with Kim Il‑Sung: stress on reunification, stress on U.S. troop withdrawal, and a willingness to claim a northern troop strength of three hundred seventy‑five thousand men. Despite the implausibility of that figure, the conversation gave the claim wide play. Item ten: The North Korean order of battle along the Demilitarized Zone remained unchanged. Analysts noted that an exact copy of a section of the Republic of Korea’s “Great Wall” anti‑tank barrier had been duplicated at a North Korean ranger training center nearby. Item eleven: Analysts regarded the current differences between the United States and Indonesia as very serious. A U.S.–Indonesian binational conference that had been established years earlier to mitigate such differences had not convened for some time, and a recent U.S. feel