CIA: Warning assessment on East Asia, Central Intelligence Agency, October

Warning assessment on East Asia, Central Intelligence Agency, October twenty‑seventh, nineteen‑eighty. A declassified memorandum that recorded the intelligence community’s view of Chinese, Vietnamese, Thai, Soviet and regional developments at the height of Cold War tensions in Southeast Asia. This record is hosted at the Black Vault. The memorandum was released to the public on January twelfth, two thousand six, through a Freedom of Information Act request filed with the Central Intelligence Agency. The declassification authority cited Executive Order one thousand ninety‑one, and the document now appears in the agency’s electronic reading room under the reference CIA‑RDP‑83‑B‑001. The memorandum reads as follows. “MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence; Deputy Director of Central Intelligence. THROUGH: Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment; National Intelligence Officer for Warning; National Intelligence Officer for East Asia. FROM: National Intelligence Officer for East Asia. SUBJECT: Warning Assessment – East Asia. The following items were discussed by the Community Representatives at the twenty‑second October warning meeting. 1. China‑Vietnam‑Kampuchea. The advent of the dry season in Kampuchea and the completion of United Nations consideration of the Kampuchea issue both presage a likely substantial increase in Vietnamese military pressure on the Democratic Kampuchean forces, with the prospect of some fighting spilling over into Thailand. Vietnam has significantly strengthened its forces in the Thai‑Kampuchea border area over the last several months. In the wake of a series of defeats in the United Nations and persistent pressure from the Democratic Kampuchean government, Hanoi appears intent on moving forcefully to contain, if not eliminate, the opposition to its military control of Kampuchea. Owing to improved logistics, stockpiling, and a greater concentration of forces, the Vietnamese are in a position to take forceful action on a wide scale with little warning. 2. Thailand. The disposition of Thai forces along the border has not changed significantly in recent months. The Thai, at best, would be in a position to offer strong resistance to limited Vietnamese incursions. Bangkok may, in fact, now be reluctant to employ aircraft in response to such incursions as it did in the past because of the augmentation of Vietnamese anti‑aircraft defenses. 3. China. The Chinese are increasing their military activity in the areas adjacent to Vietnam. They have moved additional aircraft to the border area from central China, deployed naval combatants to the South China Sea, and positioned a forward command element of an army that participated in the fighting last year closer to the border. These moves have not changed the balance of forces in the area, although they represent the type of moves that Beijing carried out prior to the fighting last year. Most analysts view these developments as a deliberate attempt by the Chinese to apply pressure on Vietnam and not a prelude to renewed hostilities. The movements serve to remind Hanoi that increased pressure on the Democratic Kampuchean government and/or Thailand will draw a response from Beijing. The Chinese may also have an interest in buttressing Thai morale. Their moves come only a few days before the arrival of the Thai Prime Minister in Beijing. 4. Soviet Union. Analysts do not view the deployment of Soviet Backfire aircraft to the Far East Military District nor a recent air‑mobile exercise in the area as contributing in any significant way to the ever‑present Sino‑Soviet tension evidenced earlier in the month by a border incident reported by both sides. The continued deployment of the Minsk task force opposite Cam Ranh Bay is, however, seen by some analysts as evidence of Soviet support for Vietnam in anticipation of greater Chinese pressure. Other analysts believe the task force is remaining primarily to assist in the salvaging of two aircraft lost at sea in the area. Whatever the intent, the Soviets are demonstrating both their concern about Chinese intentions and their interest in the security situation in Southeast Asia. Carefully worded statements provided by the Soviets to the