CIA: This is a declassified Central Intelligence Agency memorandum titled East Asia

This is a declassified Central Intelligence Agency memorandum titled East Asia Warning Assessment, dated February twentieth, nineteen eighty-one. The document is notable for its contemporaneous analysis of political developments in the People’s Republic of China and related security issues across the East Asian region. It is sourced from the public archive at theblackvault.com. The memorandum was released to the public through The Black Vault, which obtained the material under the Freedom of Information Act. The declassification authority was the Central Intelligence Agency, and the document was made available for public download on the archive’s website. The record is identified in the archive by its URL, which you can access for the full text. The document begins with the heading: “The Director of Central Intelligence, Washington, D.C. 20505. National Intelligence Officers, February twentieth, nineteen eighty-one.” It is addressed to the Director of Central Intelligence, the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, the Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment, and the National Intelligence Officer for Warning. The memorandum is signed by the Acting National Intelligence Officer for East Asia and is titled “East Asia Warning Assessment.” The memorandum reports that the following items were discussed by the Community Representatives at the eighteenth February warning meeting. First, analysts revisited the question of political ferment in China, but the discussion remained inconclusive. The text notes, “It is now generally accepted that there has been a reversal of a wide range of policies, by no means confined merely to the economic sphere, and that there have been numerous, but inconclusive, signs of political disarray over the past two months.” The assessment continues, “It is not clear yet whether these changes are permanent and strategic or temporary and tactical.” The memorandum records that most analysts appeared to accept the proposition that Deng Xiaoping has suffered a reverse since December, while a strong minority opinion suggested that Deng had merely traded some cherished policies for a further increment of power. It adds, “It is certainly true that no important leader, except the aging economic czar Chen Yun, seems to have increased his authority at Deng’s expense; on the other hand it is also difficult to see how Deng’s power has increased if he has been unable to defend and protect important programs on which his reputation is largely based.” The role of the military in the putative infighting is described as important, though its impact cannot yet be fully assessed. The memorandum states, “In any event, no analyst suggested that a new round of political madness, such as the Cultural Revolution, was in the offing.” Most analysts believed that the political infighting would spill over into the arena of foreign affairs, but the degree to which this would happen remains problematical. The document then turns to Chinese sensitivity regarding moves by the new United States administration on Taiwan. It records, “The approved for release text notes great sensitivity that China has shown to the possibility of moves by the new administration regarding the Taiwan issues reflected Deng Xiaoping’s desire to protect himself on a sensitive issue, one which leaves him exposed.” Analysts pointed to the strong Chinese reaction to the possibility of Dutch submarine sales to Taiwan as a development that should be viewed largely in the bilateral Sino‑U.S. context. The memorandum warns, “If the sale became final, Beijing could well break relations with the Hague.” Next, the memorandum addresses the reaction of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to President