CIA: The record before us is a Central Intelligence Agency National Intelligence

The record before us is a Central Intelligence Agency National Intelligence Council memorandum titled “NIO Monthly Warning Assessments: March,” dated March thirty‑first, nineteen eighty‑two. It is notable because it captures the United States intelligence community’s assessment of several volatile geopolitical flashpoints at a critical moment in the early 1980s. The document is hosted on the Black Vault archive. This memorandum was released under the authority of the CIA’s declassification review board on July twenty‑eighth, two thousand four. It appears in the CIA’s electronic reading room as part of the CIA‑RDP series, and the full text is available through the Black Vault at the URL https://archive.org/download/us-china-intel-CI02209/CI02209_djvu.txt. The memorandum opens with the heading: “The Director of Central Intelligence, Washington, D.C. 20505. National Intelligence Council. Memorandum for: Director of Central Intelligence; Deputy Director of Central Intelligence. From: National Intelligence Officer for Warning. Subject: NIO Monthly Warning Assessments: March. The reports on the NIO warning meetings are attached. Comments on warning situations follow.” The first assessment concerns Israel, the West Bank, and Lebanon: “Israel‑West Bank‑Lebanon: (1) Israel’s moves to break the Bank and Gaza have significantly increased reaction, leading to a major Israeli military incursion into southern Lebanon. The ouster of elected pro‑major West Bank cities and the Israeli decision that elections for an autonomy council will not be held until after the PLO’s power and influence has been removed represent not only the effective end to meaningful autonomy but also a virtual declaration of war on the PLO. (2) The Israelis, almost certain, and their Fatah colleagues will be una militant PLO factions for strong rep repeatedly warned that they will act against PLO forces in Lebanon if the situation escalates, and they almost certainly anticipate West Bank and Gaza will produce such future. (3) Prior to the crackdown, the intended to complete the withdrawal negotiations with Egypt but a… believe that Yasir Arafat will be unable to resist demands by more radicals. Israeli leaders have authorized military operations as a clear provocation. The crackdown in the… provocation in the very near… Begin government apparently from Sinai on schedule.” The memorandum then turns to the Iran‑Iraq front: “Iran‑Iraq: (1) The intensification of the fighting along the border and Iranian military successes have strengthened the possibility that Iran will carry the war into Iraqi territory. Iranian military incursions would sharply increase the chances of mutinies in the Iraqi army and of attempts by Iraqi military and political leaders to overthrow President Saddam Hussein. (2) If Saddam’s position is seriously threatened, he probably would attempt to avert disaster by unleashing his superior air force against Iran’s remaining facilities. The Iranians would respond with counterstrikes, and the resulting escalation of the air war might include Iranian attacks on Kuwait and other Gulf states that have been aligned with Iraq. Strikes against Saudi targets could not be ruled out. (3) The Soviet Union would attempt to turn any military escalation to its advantage by moves calculated to enhance Soviet influence in Tehran. The Soviets probably would offer military assistance to the Khomeini regime on attractive terms, and they might propose an international conference to arrange a ceasefire and to agree on measures to ‘neutralize’ or ‘demilitarize’ the Gulf, the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean. (4) The United States may be faced with urgent appeals from Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and perhaps Egypt for immediate diplomatic intervention to forestall an Iranian military breakthrough and the danger of Iranian air strikes in the western shore of the Gulf.” The next section addresses the triangular relationship among China, the United States, and the Soviet Union: “China‑US‑Soviet Union: (1) A Chinese decision to break off bilateral talks with the United States on American military sales to Taiwan and to downgrade diplomatic relations from the ambassadorial to the charge level remains a distinct