China – Frontier Regions, CIA Intelligence Assessment, April 1982.

China – Frontier Regions, CIA Intelligence Assessment, April 1982. This top‑secret report evaluates the security, economic, and ethnic‑political dynamics of China’s border provinces, and it is notable for its detailed mapping of minority groups and its candid appraisal of Beijing’s minority policy in the early 1980s. The document is hosted by The Black Vault and the full text is available at archive.org. The assessment was declassified by the Central Intelligence Agency on July sixteenth, two thousand eight, under the authority of the CIA’s declassification board. It was released to the public through a Freedom of Information Act request, case number undisclosed, and uploaded to The Black Vault on that same date. The source URL is https://archive.org/download/us-china-intel-CI02210/CI02210_djvu.txt. Top Secret. CIA – Directorate of Operations. China’s Troubled Frontier Regions – An Intelligence Assessment. Information available as of twenty‑seven March nineteen‑eighty‑two has been used in the preparation of this report. Key Judgments. Two years after its inception, Beijing’s new minority policy appears to be stagnating. Chinese leaders have not, as they had hoped, been able to carry the policy far enough to overcome years of economic mismanagement, racial conflict, and left‑ist excesses, and thus to strengthen the security of China’s border regions and contain local nationalism. Implementation has done little to integrate the minority areas more fully into the mainstream and reduce their drain on the national budget. The government believed that a moderate, constructive policy toward minorities could play an important role in improving relations with India and the moderate Arab countries, which have indeed been impressed with China’s concessions to its Muslim minorities. The policy, announced in May nineteen‑eighty, granted minority regions a measure of increased autonomy, called for minority personnel to replace significant numbers of Chinese officials, and sought to spur economic development by increasing aid and implementing incentive systems. Beijing also loosened restrictions on minority cultures and appointed prominent minority members to prestigious, though relatively powerless, positions in the national and regional governments. The policy showed some initial success but now faces major obstacles. The ambitious economic program will almost certainly fall short of expectations because of the lack of infrastructure and the shortage of qualified personnel. The implacable hostility of most minorities toward the Chinese and the resilience of local nationalism make Beijing leery of permitting greater autonomy. In addition, ethnic Chinese and minority government officials and party cadre oppose the policy on a variety of grounds—including ideology—and they fear that their own positions will be weakened. Despite China’s efforts, the border regions will remain areas of tension and a drain on the country’s limited economic resources. The chronic and occasionally serious violence that has plagued the regions is certain to continue, undermining political security and encouraging meddling by China’s neighbors, particularly the Soviet Union. Party Chairman Hu Yaobang is closely identified with minority policy. A lack of progress in minority affairs or an upsurge in violence could be used by his rivals as part of a larger campaign to discredit him. EA 82‑10045C. April nineteen‑eighty‑two. Contents. Introduction. An Intractable Problem. The New Minority Policy. Implementation: The Case of Xizang. Economic Development. Regional Autonomy. The Situation in Other Minority Regions. Cadre Opposition. Security and Subversion. Outlook. Introduction. China’s vast, sparsely populated minority areas are so important strategically and economically that they are a perennial source of concern for the government in Beijing. These regions contain important mineral reserves and sensitive military and intelligence facilities, including the Lop Nor nuclear test site. They share long borders with the Soviet Union and with its client states of Vietnam, Laos, Afghanistan, and Mongolia, as well as with its ally India. All Chinese regimes have been able to maintain only a tenuous grip on the border regions; the Communists are no exception. Beijing has failed to integrate these regions fully into the Chinese polity and economy. China does, however, strive to contain the tension so that hostile neighbors cannot exploit