CIA: China Strengthens Its Forces on the Soviet Front This is a declassified

China Strengthens Its Forces on the Soviet Front This is a declassified CIA record, released in 2007, detailing China's military buildup opposite the Soviet Union in 1982. The document, classified as Secret, is an intelligence assessment prepared by the East Asian Analysis Chief, China Division, Office of East Asian and Pacific Affairs. The document was released through a Freedom of Information Act request and is available on The Black Vault's online archive. China Strengthens Its Forces on the Soviet Front An Intelligence Assessment This paper was prepared by the East Asian Analysis Chief, China Division, OEA, and coordinated with the National Intelligence Council. The information available as of 1 December 1982 was used in this report. Key Judgments China has steadily strengthened its defenses opposite the Soviet Union since 1979, despite cuts in defense spending and reductions in the size of the People's Liberation Army. The Chinese have acted in response to a continuing Soviet military buildup along the Sino-Soviet border and in Mongolia, which has become a worrisome security concern for China. This may be one of the reasons for Beijing's willingness to resume talks with Moscow. The Chinese effort has added new units and has resulted in a 30-percent increase in major weapons in the border regions, with the northeast receiving the most attention. China's primary aim is to strengthen fortifications at the first defensible terrain along traditional invasion routes by forming new garrison units and improving the firepower and mobility of existing units. China also is strengthening the combat capabilities of main-force units located farther back. The improvements reflect Beijing's strong commitment to its strategy of defense in depth. Beijing believes that these changes would buy additional time for it to move reinforcements into secondary defensive positions and block advancing Soviet forces. We doubt, however, that the Chinese could stop a concerted Soviet attack, but they could make it potentially more costly for Soviet troops to break through the outer perimeter of China's defensive network. We believe that a stronger defense in the north may give Beijing greater flexibility in considering military operations against other neighboring countries by making it costly for the Soviets to retaliate. We expect the Chinese buildup opposite the Soviet Union to continue, but its pace and size will depend on the outcome of the current Sino-Soviet talks. The Chinese are now in a stronger bargaining position and might be willing to withdraw a few infantry divisions from border regions as a reciprocal though largely symbolic gesture of conciliation. We believe in any case China will continue to modernize its forces in the north with new and better defensive weapons as they become available. We foresee little change in Beijing's war-fighting strategy during the 1980s. China will continue to lack the modern weapons needed to stand up to the well-equipped Soviet forces, but as more advanced Chinese weapons come on line over the next few years, China should be able to partially re-dress its serious deficiencies in antitank and air defenses. We believe that by maintaining a strong and largely self-sufficient defensive capability against the Soviets, Beijing also accrues greater maneuvering room in negotiations for foreign weapons and technology. Most importantly, in our judgment the greater strategic independence resulting from this strengthened defensive posture will make Beijing increasingly unwilling to acquiesce to a high level of US arms sales to Taiwan as a means of securing its own supply relationship with the United States. This is what the public record looks like at its most ordinary. Storyflo.com. The document can be found at https://archive.org/download/us-china-intel-CI02217/CI02217_djvu.txt.