CIA: The document you are about to hear is a Central Intelligence Agency

The document you are about to hear is a Central Intelligence Agency research paper titled The Military Factor in Chinese Politics, dated March 1983. It is notable because it offers a contemporaneous U.S. intelligence assessment of the People’s Liberation Army’s role in the political system of the People’s Republic of China during the early years of Deng Xiaoping’s reforms. This paper was declassified and approved for public release on June fifth, two thousand eight, under the authority of the CIA’s declassification review. The full text is available through the Black Vault archive at the URL archive.org/download/us-china-intel-CI02223/CI02223_djvu.txt. The release was part of a broader effort to make historical intelligence assessments accessible to scholars and the public. The Military Factor in Chinese Politics — Research Paper, Office of East Asian Analysis, CIA, March 1983. The paper opens with a summary of the People’s Liberation Army’s political posture. It states: “The People’s Liberation Army, as represented in politics by a handful of powerful soldier‑politicians, has frequently been a locus of opposition to the reform policies associated with Deng Xiaoping. In our analysis, however, during the period of Deng’s ascendancy beginning in 1978, what the civilians have asked of the PLA they have generally received. If the army and its leaders at times have gone along reluctantly, they nevertheless have gone along.” The authors then list several characterizations of army‑party relations: * “The PLA does not present a solid institutional front in the face of civilian domestic and foreign policy initiatives. It is not an aggressively interventionist political actor but is frequently a reluctant partner.” * “Civilian party leaders have fashioned policies that are not to the PLA’s advantage but have suffered none of the fatal consequences anticipated in some conventional assessments of army‑party politics.” * “Although the PLA is an important political player, it by itself does not have veto power over Chinese policies or in the political succession to Deng. Senior military figures seem content to influence the political process rather than seek to dominate it.” The paper notes that senior soldier‑politicians provide the military with an important political voice, and that the military maintains a long tradition of partnership with the civilian party. It observes: “The military is amply represented on the party Politburo and Central Committee, and all available evidence indicates that the party does take into account the full range of military interests. Although civilians clearly set the political agenda, they do so in consultation with their military colleagues.” The assessment continues with a discussion of recent strains in the army‑party relationship, attributing many of those strains to the PLA’s General Political Department, which was placed under new leadership in September of the previous year. The authors describe a pattern of give‑and‑take: “A pattern of give and take, in which the party has made modest concessions in return for support on larger issues, has been characteristic of contemporary army‑party politics. China’s senior soldiers and the civilian leadership are generally in agreement on the priority of military professionalization but differ over the army’s relative priority in the overall modernization plans.” Specific areas of cooperation are listed: * “Cooperation in revising recruitment criteria, retiring aged or incompetent personnel, consolidating commands, demobilizing excessive ground forces, supporting personnel, and purging the politically unreliable, despite some reservations voiced within the PLA.” * “The problem of Mao’s legacy has not completely been laid to rest, and the army still seeks to salvage elements of Mao’s doctrine that appear relevant to current conditions.” * “The conservative disposition of some PLA leaders has led them and like‑minded civilians to voice reservations about some of Deng’s economic reforms and undesirable side effects generated by the policies, but Beijing’s senior civilians have generally sought to revise policies to meet these objections.” On foreign policy, the paper remarks that data on military opinions is thin, concluding: “Foreign policy is essentially a civilian preserve. For the duration of Deng’s active political life, the party will generally have the cooperation of the military.” Looking ahead to succession, the authors assess the prospects for Hu Yaobang, Deng’s political heir: “The prospects for Hu Yaobang to succeed Deng and to preserve army‑party harmony are enhanced by the continuing personnel turnover in the PLA. Hu will be able to count on the support of senior military men who have a vested interest in the policies initiated by Deng and who would probably take their lead from civilian leaders with whom they are allied. The influence of senior officers may increase during the succession period but not to the point where they exercise a veto over Hu’s continuation as general secretary.” The paper concludes with a table of contents outlining further analysis of the political context, mechanisms of military influence