US-China Relations: Short-Term Prospects This is a declassified CIA record from

US-China Relations: Short-Term Prospects This is a declassified CIA record from 1984, detailing China's intentions to improve relations with the United States. The document, released through The Black Vault, is a classified intelligence appraisal from the Directorate of Secret Intelligence. The document was released on an unknown date, but it is available on the archive.org website. The canonical PDF can be found at https://archive.org/download/us-china-intel-CI02251/CI02251_djvu.txt. US-China Relations: Short-Term Prospects An Intelligence Assessment July 1984 Warning Notice: Intelligence Sources or Methods Involved (WNINTEL) National Security: Unauthorized Disclosure of Information Subject to Criminal Sanctions Dissemination Control: NOFORN (NF) Not releasable to foreign nationals Not releasable to contractors or contractor consultants. PROPIN (PR) Caution: proprietary information involved ORCON (OC) Distribution and extraction of information controlled by originator This information has been sanitized for release. Derived from multiple sources, all material on this page is Unclassified. US-China Relations: Short-Term Prospects An Intelligence Assessment This paper was prepared by East Asian Analysis. Comments are welcome and may be directed to the Chief, China Division. Key Judgments Information available as of 15 June 1984 was used in this report. On US-China Relations: Short-Term Prospects Beijing since the spring of 1983 has begun implementing a basic decision to improve relations with the United States. Chinese leaders—who are acutely conscious of China's relative military weakness and absorbed by China's ambitious modernization program—want to retain the United States as a strategic counterweight to the USSR and gain greater access to US technological and economic resources. We believe Beijing will subordinate criticism of US policy toward Taiwan and other bilateral issues at least through the end of 1984 in order to build a more stable, working relationship with the Reagan administration. Beijing intends—in our view—to build on the positive atmosphere developed during the visits of Premier Zhao and President Reagan and will probably work to prevent US-China relations from becoming entangled in the US election campaign. There are limits to Beijing's ability to expand relations, however. Beijing does not want to undermine its ability to manage the Soviet threat through negotiations or to pursue expanded ties with the Third World and touchy associates, such as North Korea, by identifying too closely with Washington. As China does improve relations—especially military relations—with the United States, it will take even greater care to preserve the appearance of “independence” in its foreign policy. During the next six months, we believe China will gradually attempt to strengthen security ties with the United States by: Continuing steps toward the purchase of defensive weapon systems. Broadening discussions of strategic issues. China will continue to press for a greater US role in economic modernization through increased US investment in Chinese enterprises, greater access to US technology, and an end to alleged US trade “discrimination” against China. As the United States and China broaden their economic ties, however, Chinese expectations may exceed the ability of the United States to fulfill them. The Chinese may express their disappointment publicly, We expect the Chinese to press for US ratification of the Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, for instance, and to react—sometimes harshly— to Congressional statements doubting Chinese promises on nuclear proliferation. Nonetheless, we do not believe that the Chinese will risk damage to the overall relationship by pursuing the issue too aggressively. We believe that internal Chinese political factors will play only a minor role in US-China relations in the next six months. Some senior leaders apparently do not share Deng Xiaoping's enthusiasm for relations with the United States, but we have no evidence of significant opposition. Although Chinese leaders will be constrained by the existing strategic situation, the death of Deng Xiaoping would probably lead to a period of less activity in bilateral relations while new leadership begins to assert itself. Over the longer term, a fundamental shift in international pressures on China or altered domestic political and economic priorities would almost certainly prompt China to review its approach to the United States. Even so, we believe that, as long as China remains primarily committed to economic modernization and faces an expanding Soviet threat, Beijing's need for a security tie to Washington will remain. This is what the public record looks like at its most ordinary. The document is available at https://archive.org/download/us-china-intel-CI02251/CI02251_djvu.txt.