CIA: Cold Open.

Cold Open. This episode presents a declassified Central Intelligence Agency intelligence appraisal on the Chinese submarine‑launched ballistic missile program, dated September nineteen eighty‑four. The assessment is notable for its early estimate of the development status of China’s first strategic missile submarine and its potential impact on regional security. Provenance. The document was released to the public through The Black Vault, the online repository of declassified government records. It is available in full at the Black Vault entry for the file, accessible via the archive.org link. The declassification authority was the Central Intelligence Agency, and the material was made publicly accessible without further restriction. The Document. The appraisal begins with a heading identifying the work as a handbook of foreign missiles and their platforms. The first Chinese S‑L‑B‑M, designated the C‑S‑S‑N‑X‑J, is described as currently under development and intended for launch from the Xia‑class S‑S‑B‑N. Operational command of the forces is presumed to rest with the highest political authority in China, but virtually nothing is known of command and control arrangements. During the early nineteen sixties, the Soviets supplied the Chinese with the components of a G‑1‑class diesel‑electric ballistic missile submarine. This submarine was assembled at the Luda Shipyard during nineteen sixty‑two to nineteen sixty‑four. After serving in several roles, it was converted to serve as a test platform for the C‑S‑S‑N‑X‑3, and the slow conversion of the G‑class to a test‑launch submarine are indicators of the slow pace of development of an S‑L‑B‑M system. [four lines redacted under exemption B1] Operational deployment of this submarine missile system is not expected before the mid‑to‑late nineteen eighties. Our estimates of the capabilities and characteristics of the C‑S‑S‑N‑X‑3 are primarily engineering judgments based on limited data. We have had to judge the level of technology in China and have estimated it to be almost equal to that of the French M‑t S‑L‑B‑M. Thus, our best judgments are subject to wide confidence bounds. We believe that the C‑S‑S‑N‑X‑3 will not be considered by Chinese strategic planners as a destabilizing threat to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. To effectively threaten the bulk of Soviet urban, industrial, and military centers, Xia‑class submarines would have to patrol in the Norwegian Sea. The Chinese probably could achieve this goal before the end of the century if they chose to devote the necessary resources to such a program. Xia‑class S‑S‑B‑N. The Xia, China’s only S‑S‑B‑N, was launched in April nineteen eighty‑one and remains in service. A second Xia‑class vessel is intended to be built under the Chinese program. The Xin is based on the design of the Han S‑S‑N. Basically, the Xia was developed by adding a missile compartment of two tubes to the Han‑class S‑S‑N hull and propulsion system. The Han‑class S‑S‑N has operated little and is not yet a proven design. The first unit has been out of service for months because of probable reactor problems. Because the Xia shares this untested engineering, it might not become a fully effective ship for several years. Deployment of the Xia probably will be restricted to the waters adjacent to China at first. As a deterrent force, its potential to strike the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics from these waters is limited because only East Siberian targets would be within range. The Xia‑class S‑S‑B‑N eventually could patrol in the Norwegian Sea or off the west coast of the United States, but the Chinese Navy will have to develop the necessary skills and techniques to operate thousands of miles from China before such patrols are possible. Context. The Black Vault notes that this appraisal reflects Central