CIA: The document you are hearing is a Central Intelligence Agency intelligence

The document you are hearing is a Central Intelligence Agency intelligence appraisal titled “The Federal Republic of Germany and the Race to Beijing,” dated January fourteenth, nineteen eighty‑five. It is notable because it provides a contemporaneous U.S. assessment of West German diplomatic and commercial outreach to the People’s Republic of China, including nuclear cooperation, during a period of shifting Cold‑War alignments. The source is archived at the Black Vault and available online at archive.org. This appraisal was released to the public through a Freedom of Information Act request to the Central Intelligence Agency. The declassification authority cited Executive Order one two nine fifty‑eight, and the document was posted on the Black Vault website on an unspecified date. The CIA’s release note states that the material has been cleared for public dissemination and is no longer classified. Now, the text of the appraisal. “DISSEMINATION NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS. NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS/CONSULTANTS. CAUTION—PROPRIETARY INFORMATION INVOLVED. DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR. The Federal Republic of Germany and the Race to Beijing. Bureau of Intelligence and Research. Research Assessment and Summary. Chancellor Kohl used his 1984 visit to the People’s Republic of China to solidify FRG‑PRC ties—commercial, political, and cultural—and to burnish his image for home consumption. Kohl was eager to enhance tangible FRG‑PRC cooperation, already considerable, including that in the nuclear field. Germany is China’s fourth‑largest trade partner after the United States, Japan, and Hong Kong. Five years after then‑Premier Hua Guofeng’s 1979 visit to the FRG, 1984 saw an exceptional number of FRG leaders visiting the PRC. Preceding Kohl were several cabinet ministers, Social Democratic Party leaders, and the heads of three FRG states trying to sell everything from bicycles to satellite technology. The FRG just agreed to ten development projects worth twenty‑five million Deutsche marks over the next decade and granted the PRC an initial capital loan of fifty million Deutsche marks. In May the two countries signed an agreement on the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The PRC reciprocates the FRG’s growing interest in expanding commercial and political ties. Last year it opened a consulate general in Hamburg and trade offices there and in Frankfurt. During his June visit to the FRG, Vice Premier Li Peng pressed for favorable credit terms on a broad range of technology exports. First on both nations’ lists is nuclear energy— with the PRC interested in know‑how, hardware, power reactors, and access to German uranium enrichment technology. The FRG wants to be forthcoming—except for China’s enrichment wishes—as a means of propping up the listless German economy. Increasing its world share of the nuclear energy market is one of the FRG’s major export priorities. FRG exports to the PRC continued to recover in 1983, reaching one point zero seven billion dollars, after having fallen from their 1979 peak of one point four nine billion dollars. The FRG hopes another multimillion‑Deutsche‑mark gain will result from discussions of the possible sale of two one‑thousand‑megawatt reactors, a deal that could double Bonn’s export guarantees dedicated to the PRC. In seeking to expand trade with the PRC, the FRG will resist any protectionist applications by the United States of COCOM rules. But although it pursues broader ties with the PRC, the FRG carefully gauges its cooperation in military‑related fields. Germans of all persuasions respond with polite caution to any PRC expression of support for German unity and are wary of PRC criticism of either superpower. As in many foreign‑policy contexts, Bonn shapes its PRC policy with an eye on U.S. and Soviet sensitivities. Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls. COCOM members are Japan and NATO members except Iceland and Spain. Introduction—West Germans are fascinated with China—its history, customs, art, size, and virtually untapped economic potential. They know that economic ties alone will not adequately encompass the future breadth of PRC‑FRG relations. Helmut Kohl and all other German leaders seek expansion of political and cultural as well as commercial contacts. One common feature of the 1984 PRC visits of Kohl, Willy Brandt, and Helmut Schmidt was that these leading Germans “went more to hear Chinese views than