CIA: The document you are hearing is a Central Intelligence Agency intelligence

The document you are hearing is a Central Intelligence Agency intelligence appraisal titled “China – Military Reform Campaign,” dated October third, nineteen eighty‑five. It offers a contemporary U.S. assessment of the People’s Liberation Army’s ten‑year restructuring under Deng Xiaoping, a period that reshaped China’s armed forces and continues to inform analyses of its current capabilities. This appraisal was released to the public through The Black Vault archive, which reproduces the declassified CIA material. The record appears in the agency’s historical collection and was made available without a specific FOIA case number; the declassification authority is the CIA’s Office of Information Management. The appraisal opens with a concise summary. It notes that Deng Xiaoping’s ten‑year campaign to reform the People’s Liberation Army culminated during the summer of nineteen eighty‑four. The most dramatic aspect, according to the report, was the June announcement that the standing force would be trimmed by one million men, representing one‑quarter of the total active‑military strength. Other aspects were described as equally far‑reaching. The force was reorganized to promote better coordination among infantry, artillery, and armor. Training and field exercises featured closer integration of air and ground forces. A vigorous campaign to rejuvenate the officer corps brought about a sharp reduction in the age of commanders and staffs at all levels. The militia system was revived and strengthened, as were the academies and schools providing education for officers. The armed forces were portrayed as less involved in the political process than at any time since the founding of the People’s Republic, with professionalism and military expertise described as the order of the day. The appraisal concludes that the implications for China’s military capabilities were profound: the PLA was younger, better educated, better led, more professional than ever before, and more prepared to meet the challenges of military modernization. The report then provides background on the PLA’s political role. In the early nineteen seventies, the PLA was the dominant political force in China. The party and government bureaucracies had been devastated by the Cultural Revolution, and regional units of the armed forces stepped in to restore order and re‑establish governmental functions. At the national level, the military played a major role in the power struggle after Mao’s death, conducting the arrest of leftist leaders—the so‑called Gang of Four—and sponsoring Hua Guofeng’s accession to power. Since Hua’s ouster, Deng sharply curtailed the PLA’s political role. Military membership on the nineteen eighty‑two twelfth Central Committee fell to twenty‑two percent, continuing a steady decline from the high of forty‑five percent in nineteen sixty‑nine. In nineteen eighty‑two, Deng arranged the transfer of most military region commanders, removing potential opponents from their local power bases. The range of policy issues in which the PLA could voice a view narrowed, though on matters directly involving military interests it remained influential because of its increasing professionalism. Education and training improvements were highlighted. Since nineteen seventy‑nine, the system of professional military schools run by the PLA had been revived, expanded, and improved. At the senior level, officer candidates now attend four‑year courses that combine basic military training with a college‑level academic education, in contrast to the purely military two‑year course offered previously. Real combat experience is gained by the small number of graduates posted to units deployed along the border with Vietnam. Soldiers may still rise from the ranks to receive a commission, but only if they have the required secondary school education and attend one of the four‑year academies. Higher‑ranking officers must now attend the appropriate intermediate‑ or senior‑level professional school to be eligible for promotion or command, and must demonstrate basic literacy and the equivalent of a secondary education, attending school part‑time if necessary. Basic training is being improved, and the proportion of training time devoted to political rather than military topics has declined. A professional development program for non‑commissioned officers was noted as still lacking, although occasional statements