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CIA: We begin with a declassified Central Intelligence Agency intelligence appraisal

2026-08-02
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CIA: We begin with a declassified Central Intelligence Agency intelligence appraisal
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We begin with a declassified Central Intelligence Agency intelligence appraisal dated October third, nineteen eighty‑six, titled “China: Poor Outlook for the Three Gorges Project.” The document is notable because it lays out the United States intelligence community’s assessment of the technical, financial, and political challenges facing what was then the world’s largest proposed hydroelectric dam. The material was released through a Freedom of Information Act request and made publicly available by The Black Vault on September twenty‑third, two thousand ten. The agency’s declassification authority is noted in the original file as the Director of Central Intelligence. The full text can be accessed at the Black Vault archive link for this record. The document opens with a summary. It states: “We believe the Three Gorges hydroelectric project is a far cry from the ‘sure thing’ China’s power ministry has tried to convince the United States and other foreign parties it is.” The assessment identifies seven major obstacles that must be overcome for the project to become a reality. First, the World Bank must endorse the project. Second, low‑cost financing must be secured. Third, China’s economy must improve. Fourth, stronger domestic political support must be found. Fifth, a strategy for meeting short‑term energy needs must be agreed to. Sixth, better management of limited resources must be realized. Seventh, a division of labor between Chinese and foreign firms must be worked out. The appraisal continues: “If the Chinese Government approves the project, we believe low‑cost loans, grants, and supplier credits from Japan, Canada, and elsewhere will give foreign firms the edge over the United States in bidding on the project.” It notes that the State Council has again deferred a final decision until late nineteen eighty‑seven, assigning responsibility for the project to two new offices and authorizing further feasibility studies, with Canada conducting studies and the World Bank supervising. The report describes the scale of the undertaking. The dam would provide more than thirteen thousand megawatts, roughly fifteen percent of China’s total power capacity at the time, and would also offer flood control and improved navigation on the Yangtze River. Cost estimates range from ten to sixteen billion dollars, with construction projected to take ten to twenty years. Regarding financing, the assessment estimates that China will need five to eight billion dollars in foreign exchange for the project and is seeking low‑cost, concessionary loans. Vice Premier Li Peng, identified as China’s energy czar, reportedly told U.S. officials that the project would not proceed without such financing. The appraisal doubts that the World Bank or Japan’s Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund will provide sufficient support, noting that the World Bank has indicated it would not finance the project alone, and that Japanese allocations may be contested by Chinese industries. The document calculates that, assuming a thirty‑year pay‑back period, foreign loan repayment costs would rise to at least five hundred million dollars per year for a decade or more. It also estimates that China would need an additional fifteen to twenty‑five billion yuan—four to seven billion dollars—to cover costs not financed by foreign loans, a sum exceeding China’s entire hydropower budget for the previous decade. Leadership support is identified as a critical factor. The appraisal concludes that the backing of either Deng Xiaoping or Zhao Ziyang would be essential, while noting that Vice Premier Li Peng appears only a lukewarm supporter. It suggests that opposition from other ministries and provincial governments could delay a decision, especially if urgent power needs drive China toward quicker‑to‑build thermal plants. No additional contextual statement was issued by the Central Intelligence Agency accompanying this appraisal. This is what the public record looks like at its most ordinary. For the full document, visit storyflo.com and the Black Vault URL at archive.org/download/us‑china‑intel‑CI02274/CI02274_djvu.txt.
CIA: We begin with a declassified Central Intelligence Agency intelligence appraisal · Storyflo