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CIA: China’s Marine Forces: In Search of Professionalism – Central Intelligence

2026-08-02
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China’s Marine Forces: In Search of Professionalism – Central Intelligence Agency, March third, nineteen eighty‑seven. This appraisal is notable because it provides a contemporaneous U.S. intelligence view of how the People’s Republic of China was building a fledgling amphibious capability during the 1980s. The document was released to the public through The Black Vault, which posted the full text after it was obtained via a Freedom of Information Act request. The declassification authority is listed as the Central Intelligence Agency, and the release date on the archive is recorded as the date the file was uploaded to the public website. The document begins with a standard warning notice. It reads: “WARNING NOTICE—INTELLIGENCE SOURCES OR METHODS INVOLVED.” The appraisal then states: “The Chinese probably see the visit to China of United States Marine Corps Commandant, General P. X. Kelley, as an opportunity to study the organization and tactics of the United States Marine Corps, possibly as a model for China’s fledgling Marine forces.” It continues: “Beijing seems most interested in the United States Marine Corps’ recruit selection and training, coordination of combined‑arms operations, and logistics and organizational setups.” The assessment adds: “We believe Beijing could institute major reforms in its amphibious training and tactics as a result of close contacts with the United States Marine Corps that could significantly enhance China’s amphibious warfare capabilities over the next five to ten years.” The report notes that Beijing has “almost no experience in modern amphibious operations and created its first Marine brigade of five thousand men in the South Sea Fleet in nineteen eighty.” It observes that “the Chinese Marines have been involved in increasingly realistic training but still lack adequate naval gunfire support and the experience in complex combined‑arms operations to conduct a landing against anything but a lightly defended beachhead.” The appraisal further records that “Beijing has worked to ensure its Marines have adequate amphibious lift capability and the South Sea Fleet now has enough landing ships to transport the entire Marine brigade.” It warns that “U.S. allies in the Pacific almost certainly will express concerns anew if China makes significant improvements in its Marine force, especially if the United States is perceived as aiding this development.” The document emphasizes that “Beijing’s primary concern is defense of the Paracel Islands and we see no indications that the Chinese intend to use their amphibious forces to support major offensive operations against Taiwan or Vietnam.” It then provides a historical overview. It states: “All of China’s amphibious assaults have been carried out by units of the Chinese ground forces cross‑trained in amphibious assault, not by Navy‑subordinated assault units.” It recounts early operations: “In October nineteen forty‑nine, Beijing’s first major assault ended in failure when Communist troops, landing in lightly armed junks and rafts, took several thousand casualties in an aborted attack against Jinmen Island in the Taiwan Strait.” It continues: “In March nineteen fifty, the Communists successfully seized Hainan Island by staging six diversionary landings at the city of Haikou but conducting the main assault on beaches to the west and east of the city. Communist casualties were high, however, as hundreds of Chinese troops drowned when their rafts towed by motorized junks capsized.” It adds: “Beijing’s most impressive assault occurred in January nineteen fifty‑five when six thousand Chinese soldiers using four amphibious landing ships and numerous junks overwhelmed a garrison of one thousand one hundred Nationalist troops on Yijiang Island, just north of the Taiwan Strait. This was the first coordinated assault with air and naval gunfire, and United States observers noted that the operation was carried out in textbook fashion.” The appraisal also mentions a more recent operation: “The most recent experience
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