CIA: The Central Intelligence Agency’s analytical report on Chinese leadership

The Central Intelligence Agency’s analytical report on Chinese leadership decision‑making in the weeks leading to the June 1989 crackdown, dated September 1989, offers a contemporaneous chronology of the internal power struggle that preceded the events on Tiananmen Square. It is notable because it documents the assessments of senior U.S. intelligence officers on the roles of Deng Xiaoping, Yang Shangkun, Zhao Ziyang and the so‑called “old guard” during that pivotal period. The document was released to the public through a Freedom of Information Act request and posted on The Black Vault website. The release is identified by the Black Vault entry for the CIA record, with the full text available for download at the archive.org link provided. The declassification authority was the CIA’s Office of Information Management, and the material was cleared for public release in September 1989. The report begins with its heading and scope note: “The Road to the Tiananmen Crackdown: An Analytic Chronology of Chinese Leadership Decision Making. EA 89‑10030. September 1989. Scope Note: Information available as of twenty‑nine August nineteen‑eighty‑nine was used in this report.” It then explains its purpose: “This paper provides a baseline analytic chronology of the Chinese leadership’s decision‑making between the death of Hu Yaobang on fifteen April nineteen‑eighty‑nine and the ouster of General Secretary Zhao Ziyang at the fourth Plenum of the Party Central Committee on twenty‑three to twenty‑four June nineteen‑eighty‑nine. It is not an attempt to look beyond the watershed events of April through June or assess their significance, but an effort to preserve what happened in one document.” The authors note their sources: “The paper draws mainly from accounts in the Chinese and Hong Kong press, which both sides in the leadership struggle used to explain their actions and rally support for their respective positions.” The summary of the four phases reads: “Chinese leadership decisions leading up to the crackdown on pro‑democracy demonstrations and the subsequent purge by Deng Xiaoping and other party hardliners appear to have gone through four major phases: • From fifteen to twenty‑six April, the regime tried intimidation, making statements and publishing editorials that were so provocative they fueled rather than cooled the demonstrations. • From twenty‑six April to twenty May, then Party General Secretary Zhao Ziyang tried to soften the regime’s tactics, causing an irreparable split between Zhao and the hardliners. • The hardliners regained control over decision‑making in the third phase, twenty May through four June, which culminated in the bloody crackdown on Tiananmen Square. • Beginning on five June, the hardliners turned their attention to consolidating power and removing potential threats to their control.” The report then draws several conclusions about the key figures: “First, Deng Xiaoping probably approved of and directed the entire crackdown. He signed the order sending the troops into Tiananmen Square on three‑four June; he brought back the old guard when the Party Standing Committee faltered; and he personally dealt with the military. Deng was clearly worried that the demonstrators would lead China toward anarchy. He witnessed the crowds in the square, knowing that demonstrations had spread to cities throughout China and were increasingly supported by workers and party and government officials.” “Second, next to Deng, Yang Shangkun was the pivotal figure in the crisis. Military units under his relatives