CIA: Cold Open.

Cold Open. This is a declassified Central Intelligence Agency intelligence report on the People’s Republic of China, dated February fifteenth, nineteen ninety‑one. The document, known in the archive as China Lights, is notable for its assessment of Chinese attitudes toward the Gulf war and the political climate in Hong Kong as the 1997 handover approached. Provenance. The report was released to the public through The Black Vault, the online repository for declassified U.S. government records. The file was uploaded on the archive’s website without a specific Freedom of Information Act case number, and the declassification authority is listed as the Central Intelligence Agency’s Office of Information Management. The Document. The report opens with the classification markings: “S‑E‑C‑R‑E‑T, N‑O‑F‑O‑R‑N, N‑O‑C‑O‑N‑T‑R‑A‑C‑T, O‑R‑C‑O‑N, E‑X‑D‑I‑S.” It is identified as “Office of Analysis for East Asia and Pacific, China Lights, Report Number one hundred eighty‑nine.” The first section is titled “I. P‑R‑C / Gulf: Pride and Passivity,” dated February twelfth, nineteen ninety‑one. The text reads: “China’s response to the Gulf war remains largely passive, but conservative elders may be arguing that more active involvement is necessary to forestall U‑S domination of the Middle East. One high‑ranking P‑R‑C official recently indicated China is considering a ‘more active’ role in the Gulf but would prefer, for now, that other countries take the lead. A recent People’s Daily article chided the European Community for ‘becoming a political dwarf once again’ as a result of its ‘failure to speak with one voice’—presumably against use of force against Iraq. So far, the P‑R‑C has avoided endorsing any cease‑fire initiative; it expressed ‘appreciation’ for the proposals of Yemen, Algeria, and others but said ‘the time is not yet ripe’ to exert its own diplomatic efforts.” The report continues: “Vice Foreign Minister Yang Fuchang departed for Iran, Syria, Turkey, and Yugoslavia on a visit postponed from mid‑January, probably intended to sample opinion, not to present P‑R‑C initiatives.” It adds: “Deng Xiaoping favors a low‑key response to the Gulf crisis and international affairs in general. China’s policy has been to avoid taking sides on the war and keep some distance from the United States, to the extent of seeming to equate U‑S and Iraqi actions. Supporters of this policy do not want to put bilateral economic ties at risk over differences on the Gulf.” The next section, “II. P‑R‑C / Hong Kong: Deciding Who’s in Charge,” dated February thirteenth, nineteen ninety‑one, states: “The Hong Kong governor’s late‑January discussions with Premier Li Peng and other officials eased tensions in P‑R‑C‑Hong Kong relations. It appears the governor signaled a willingness to accommodate some P‑R‑C concerns and China agreed to be less confrontational in public as long as the British‑run Hong Kong government is willing to compromise.” The report notes: “The governor’s visit raised the level of discussion, improved the atmosphere, and may have facilitated agreement on difficult issues. Proof of better relations may come in the course of upcoming joint liaison group and experts’ talks, a planned March visit to Hong Kong by the head of the P‑R‑C’s Hong Kong and Macao affairs office, and a projected April visit to Beijing by British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd.” It further observes: “In the wake of Tiananmen, and as 1997 looms closer, Britain and the Hong Kong government have taken