CIA: This is a declassified Central Intelligence Agency intelligence report on China

This is a declassified Central Intelligence Agency intelligence report on China and Taiwan, dated March twenty‑eighth, nineteen ninety‑one. The document is notable because it offers a contemporaneous U.S. assessment of Taiwan’s constitutional reforms and of China’s strategic outlook as the Cold War era drew to a close. The text was released to the public through The Black Vault website, uploaded from a Freedom of Information Act request. The declassification was authorized by the Director of Central Intelligence, and the release date on the archive is listed as the early 2000s. The source is the original CIA Office of Analysis for East Asia and Pacific file, now available in the public domain. The document begins with a heading from the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Office of Analysis for East Asia and Pacific, and is identified as Report Number one hundred ninety‑two. It is organized into five sections. I will read the first three sections, which comprise the core analysis. I. Taiwan: Democratization By Design (updated March nineteenth, revised March twenty‑eighth) After a year of careful preparation, and contrary to the wishes of some once‑powerful mainlander politicians, Taiwan is poised to amend its constitution to make it more democratic and consistent with political reality. The challenge is to shift power from elderly mainlanders to the Taiwanese majority without discrediting the ruling Kuomintang. Advocates and opponents of Taiwan independence will become more vocal, but President Lee Teng‑hui’s drive for cautious yet meaningful change is likely to prevail. Last spring President Lee proclaimed mainland‑policy revision and constitutional reform his two highest goals. Lee’s National Unification Council has just announced new “reunification” guidelines to improve cross‑strait ties; the president will turn now to constitutional reform. By dealing first with mainland policy, Lee hopes to reassure both Beijing and elderly Kuomintang figures that constitutional reform is not a ploy for independence. Reform timetable and content The Kuomintang constitutional‑reform plan envisages a cumbersome two‑stage process stretching through mid‑1992. The National Assembly, dominated by “old thieves” elected on the mainland in nineteen forty‑seven, meets on April eighth to launch the procedural stage. It will abolish the “temporary provisions” that suspended normal constitutional provisions during “the period of communist rebellion,” authorize interim presidential powers and election of a reapportioned assembly, and consider constitutional changes. A new assembly of prospectively three hundred twenty‑seven seats, including a majority of members representing Taiwan districts, eighty “at‑large” members and twenty seats reserved for overseas Chinese representatives, would be elected this winter and meet in early nineteen ninety‑two to amend the constitution. A new assembly will be reapportioned to increase representation from Taiwan province while retaining a small number of seats for mainlanders; the Taiwan governor and major city mayors will, for the first time, be directly elected; and the president will be given new, as yet undefined, powers. An unresolved question is whether the president—next up for re‑election in nineteen ninety‑six—will be elected directly or indirectly. Taiwan for the Taiwanese After reforms, representative bodies and most important officials will be elected directly by Taiwan’s people—a transformation with important implications for a possible future shift from Taiwan’s announced goal of reunification. Democratization and “Taiwanization” will probably not bring early change to Taiwan’s mainland policy. Given the delicacy of Taiwan’s position in relation to the People’s Republic of China, both the Kuomintang and most of the opposition agree that caution and stability are needed so as not