CIA: Review of dual‑use C-O-C-O-M technology provided to China, a declassified

Review of dual‑use C-O-C-O-M technology provided to China, a declassified Central Intelligence Agency background paper dated January fourth, nineteen ninety‑three. This document appears in the public archive hosted by The Black Vault, accessible at archive dot org slash download slash us‑china‑intel‑CI02314 slash CI02314_djvu dot txt. It was released to the public through a Freedom of Information Act request, declassified by the CIA’s Director of Central Intelligence. The paper is a background briefing prepared for the ranking minority member of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. Its purpose is to provide information concerning China’s legal acquisition of dual‑use technology. Points of major interest are organized as follows. First, the Defense Intelligence Agency, pronounced D‑I‑A, was tasked to review technology and equipment passing to China since the Tiananmen Square events. The review covered C‑O‑C‑O‑M members and United States exports, examining their military uses and the extent to which China re‑exports weapons developed from Western technology. The D‑I‑A examined seven hundred sixty‑four European and Japanese C‑O‑C‑O‑M technology cases and two thousand eight hundred United States commercial and C‑O‑C‑O‑M license approvals for shipment or shipped to China since June nineteen eighty‑nine. Specific cases were selected for further review based on equipment description, stated end use, or stated end user. Export licenses are usually valid for two years upon approval, so the cases examined were those approved between September nineteen eighty‑eight and October nineteen ninety‑two. Second, the approved licenses for exports to China cover a wide range of American know‑how in the fields of aerospace, electronics, and shipbuilding. Particular Chinese focus was on computer‑assisted design, computer‑assisted manufacturing technology, and machine tools. Appendix one describes how China targets dual‑use technologies for its military industries. Third, the intermediate or ultimate consignees in most of the export licenses were clearly and directly identified as Chinese weapons test centers; defense ministries and their academies, factories, research institutes, and import‑export corporations; and the universities of the military‑industrial infrastructure. The technologies approved for shipment have applications in research, development, and manufacturing phases of Chinese weapons and include systems such as cruise missiles, the next generation fighter, naval vessels, and tactical or strategic missiles. Appendix two amplifies this point. Fourth, the European and Japanese C‑O‑C‑O‑M exports traceable to a military application generally involved finished subcomponents for potential resale in weapons such as FISHBED interceptors to Iran or LUDA frigates to Thailand. A majority of the European and Japanese, and a large number of American, export licenses were for telecommunications equipment, but it is difficult to determine whether a specific piece of dual‑use equipment or technology was used by a military entity. Appendix three details other C‑O‑C‑O‑M technology going to Chinese military industries. The paper then outlines expected developments. Barring a dramatic shift in Beijing’s political scene, China’s leaders will continue to acquire advanced Western technology as a means of modernizing the country’s military‑industrial infrastructure. China is expected to continue its policy of targeting dual‑use technology for incorporation in military research, development, and production facilities. With the exception of finished subcomponents, most of the technologies addressed in this paper will take time to be fully assimilated into Chinese weapons systems. Nevertheless, these weapons ultimately will see service in China’s military and almost certainly will be made available for export. Appendices list dual‑use technology and military industrial modernization, United States technology approved for export to China, and technology sold by other C‑O‑C‑O‑M nations to China. This is what the public record looks like at its most ordinary. storyflo dot com, archive dot org slash download slash us‑china‑intel‑CI02314 slash CI02314_djvu dot txt.