FBI: Report to Congress on Chinese espionage activities against the United States

Report to Congress on Chinese espionage activities against the United States, unclassified, circa nineteen ninety‑eight. This FBI‑produced briefing was required by the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year nineteen ninety‑eight, Section three hundred eight, and represents the second annual submission of that mandated report. The document was released to the public through The Black Vault archive, uploaded as a digitized text file on the site archive.org. The release is identified in the public record as a declassified FBI briefing, made available without further restriction by the agency’s declassification authority. The briefing opens with a background statement: “The Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year nineteen ninety‑eight, Section three hundred eight, requires the Director of Central Intelligence and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, jointly and in consultation with the heads of other appropriate federal agencies, to prepare and transmit to Congress a report on the intelligence activities of the People’s Republic of China directed against or affecting the interests of the United States. This is the second annual submission of that report.” It then provides an overview of the threat. “Beijing’s national security priorities include maintaining internal stability, gathering salient technology information to advance China’s economic development, and monitoring, as well as influencing, developments related to Taiwan and worldwide perceptions of China. Its foreign intelligence collection goals include gathering information about key players and developments in countries that might affect China’s interests. Penetrating the United States intelligence community is a key objective of the Chinese.” The briefing notes the limited resources of China’s intelligence collection in nineteen ninety‑eight: “China’s intelligence collection continued to be accomplished by a network of non‑professional individuals and organisations acting outside the direction and control of the intelligence services. Non‑intelligence organisations—such as private companies, research institutes, and defence facilities—conduct independent and coordinated collection activities to acquire sensitive information and technology.” It describes the historic use of Chinese students abroad: “The Chinese intelligence services have a long history of using Chinese students studying abroad to collect information, either formally for those services or informally for home‑based research institutes or universities. Many Chinese students in graduate schools study hard sciences and are able to collect a wide variety of information that is of value to China’s efforts to ascend the technology ladder.” Because China views itself as in a developmental “catch‑up” situation, the collection programme is broad: “Chinese collectors target information and technology on anything of value to China, which leads them to seek to collect open‑source information as well as restricted, proprietary and classified information.” The briefing lists the principal Chinese entities assumed to have direct responsibility for collection activities targeting the United States in nineteen ninety‑nine: * The Ministry of State Security, responsible for civilian foreign intelligence collection and counter‑intelligence operations. * The Military Intelligence Department of the People’s Liberation Army General Staff, also known as the Second Department, which collects military and technological intelligence and foreign intelligence. * The Liaison Department, a unit in the PLA’s General Political Department, which collects intelligence on Taiwan. It then outlines political espionage: “Beijing continues to view the United States as one of its major targets for political collection. It focuses on foreign policies and intentions of the United States as well as information on U.S. leaders and sensitive bilateral or multilateral negotiations.” Military espionage is described as the primary focus: “As the most advanced military power with respect to equipment and strategic capabilities, the United States continues to be the primary target of the Military Intelligence Department. Collection is primarily conducted by military attachés assigned to the defence attaché’s office in the Chinese Embassy in Washington and the Military Staff Committee at the United Nations in New York City. Attachés openly collect information from Western publications and contacts in accordance with directives, though at least two clandestine operations have been interdicted by the Federal Aviation Administration and the Customs Service since nineteen eighty‑seven.” The briefing also references a recent Federal case: “The sentencing of Dr. Peter H. Lee on twenty‑six March nineteen ninety‑eight concluded an important foreign‑related investigation. Dr. Lee pleaded guilty in December of the previous year to charges for