CIA: The document we read today is a Central Intelligence Agency analytical piece

The document we read today is a Central Intelligence Agency analytical piece on the emerging split between the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China, written in the early 1960s. It is notable because it captures the internal debate within the United States intelligence community as the once‑assumed Sino‑Soviet alliance began to fracture. This record was released to the public through The Black Vault archive, where it appears as a digitized text file. The file was posted without a formal FOIA case number, and the declassification authority is listed as the Central Intelligence Agency, which cleared the material for public dissemination. The CIA and Double Demonology* Calling the Sino‑Soviet Split Harold P. Ford Once it was widely believed that the USSR and Communist China were firm allies acting in concert to spread Communist influence everywhere they could in the world. In the early 1950s, there was much to support that image. Harold P. Ford held senior positions in both the National Intelligence Council and the Directorate of Operations. Sino‑Soviet relations are in a critical phase just short of an acknowledged and definitive split. There is no longer much of a fundamental resolution of differences. In our view, the chances that such a split can be avoided in 1962 are no better than even. NIE 11‑5‑62, February 1962! [Ambassador George Kennan:] In summary, it seems to me that Chinese‑Soviet relations bid fair to receive, in the coming months, a certain easement.... An environment of continued sharp, military bipolarity will leave the two partners little choice but to repress their differences and carry on. [Ambassador Charles (Chip) Bohlen:] I am inclined to agree with George… there is not the slightest sign that any adjustments of the basic elements of that dispute have been or are in process… Comments on NIE 11‑5‑62, May 1962 The Soviet party is opportunist and revisionist; it lacks any deep knowledge of Marxism; its ideas about disarmament are absurd; peaceful coexistence could mean nothing, except as a tactical weapon to deceive the enemy; the Soviet idea of a division of labor among the countries of the socialist camp is wrong; and China must go her own way. Deng Xiaoping, November 1960? Once it was widely believed that the USSR and Communist China were firm allies acting in concert to spread Communist influence everywhere they could in the world. In the early 1950s, there was much to support that image. Mao Tse‑tung’s regime had triumphed in China and then allied itself formally with the Soviet Union. Communist North Korea had invaded the Republic of Korea. Communist China had intervened massively in that war. The USSR had provided its Communist allies with military assistance, including Soviet‑piloted MiGs. The trouble was, among US policymakers such an image of Sino‑Soviet solidarity persisted long after the Moscow—Beijing relationship had in fact begun to fray, badly. Furthermore, that image persisted long after officers from various CIA units had begun to alert consumers that a Sino‑Soviet break was definitely developing. Not all CIA officers were of one mind: some remained reluctant to change their long‑held view of Communist bloc solidarity. All in all, however, the dominant voice of CIA analysis was out in front of the rest of the Intelligence Community in trying to alert policymaking consumers that the United States might someday face a significantly changed strategic situation. This article treats the highlights of that Sino‑Soviet story: the judgments CIA officers made in the years up to 1963, by which time estrangement between Moscow and Beijing had become publicly evident; why these CIA officers came to hold those particular views; what they were up against in trying to promote their heresy amidst many policymakers who remained true believers; and the impact these CIA officers’ judgments had—or did not have—on policymakers. * “Double demonology” is the author’s phrase for the efforts by analysts of Soviet and Chinese affairs in the 1950s and early 1960s to explore and highlight the deepening split between the two Communist powers, or “demons.” The differences between Peiping and Moscow are so basic and are so much a product of the different situations and problems in the two countries that any genuine resolution of the fundamental differences is unlikely